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Though crafted to close a gap in U.S. securities regulation, the Williams
Act suffers a serious loophole of its own.' Courts construing the Act have
established a remedial approach to violations that renders the
2Act essentially toothless in major respects. Worse, the courts'
Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. Special thanks to the
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1. See, e.g., Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D.N.J. 1985)
(recognizing that the Williams Act does not provide a private right of action to remedy
violations of the Act); see infra text accompanying notes 21-45, 67-69 (noting that,
although the Williams Act purports to require more complete disclosure, the absence of a
statutory enforcement scheme provides no incentive for individuals to meet the timely filing
requirements).
2. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 50-51, 56-60, 65 (1975)
(interpreting § 13(d) of the Williams Act and recognizing that injunctive relief is not an
appropriate remedy for a violation of the Act under the particular circumstances of the case).
Since Rondeau, many lower courts deferring to the decision have been reluctant to hold that
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approach invites gamesmanship that undermines the Act's very
3purpose.
The Williams Act purports to foster market efficiency and investor
protection by mandating certain disclosures when someone either
purchases a significant stake in a public company or undertakes a tender
offer for the stock of a public company.4 Each of these instances
implicates the question of company control. But, with respect to the
former situation-the purchase of a significant stake in a public
company-there is little incentive to honor the general disclosure
requirement because of judicial interpretation of the Act.
Because the deficiency in question is a judicial creation, courts can
rectify the situation by reconsidering precedent. Alternatively, Congress
could amend the Act, or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
could engage in corrective rulemaking-a move that would be particularly
appropriate in light of the current re-examination of U.S. securities
regulation.5  Further, the SEC, through administrative proceedings or
through the exercise of applicable civil-litigation powers can rectify the
a failure to meet disclosure requirements under § 13(d) constitutes irreparable harm,
therefore curbing the grant of injunctions for violations of § 13(d). See Gen. Aircraft Corp.
v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 1977) (interpreting Rondeau to mean that an injunction
cannot be issued solely for a Williams Act violation); Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F.
Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1985) (citing Rondeau for the proposition that a failure to
meet § 13(d)'s filing requirements in a timely manner does not create an irreparable injury
that warrants injunctive relief); Condec Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (explaining that under Rondeau, failure to meet § 13(d)'s disclosure
requirements does not constitute irreparable harm unless the nondisclosure was particularly
egregious). Through restricting the issuance of injunctions, courts have failed to discourage
acts of noncompliance, thereby rendering the Williams Act's disclosure requirements largely
ineffective. See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970) (explaining that,
if late filing is permitted by the courts rather than discouraged by an injunction, insurgents
will have no incentive to file on time, and the purpose of the Williams Act-to ensure
prompt disclosure-will be defeated). For a more in-depth discussion of the approach taken
by courts in response to violations of the Williams Act, see infra Part III.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 276-99 (explaining how, under current judicial
construction, managers can actively evade compliance with the Act without fearing the
imposition of harsh penal remedies).
4. See Mark L. Berman, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 580, 583-84 (1987) (discussing the objectives of the Williams Act).
5. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.) (containing over two hundred rulemaking mandates, including dozens directed
toward the Securities and Exchange Commission); see also DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL
LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, i-ii (2010), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecfl
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ld4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910
Financial ReformSummary.pdf (noting that the Act authorizes 243 rulemakings, 95 of
which are directed toward the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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situation unilaterally, an action which is particularly appropriate in the
wake of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010.6
The timeliness of such undertakings could not be greater, as the financial
crisis of 2008-2009 underscored the importance of adequate, accurate
disclosure. Furthermore, the SEC has a renewed interest in the Williams
Act of late, as evidenced by its high-profile investigation into Berkshire
Hathaway" and its equally notable enforcement action against billionaire
brothers Sam and Charles Wyly; 9 both incidents involved alleged Williams
Act violations.
Part I of this Article sets forth the background, purpose, and intended
operation of the Williams Act. It also discusses the Act's enforcement.
Because this Article focuses on violations that are subject only to equitable
relief, Part II lays out the general principles of equitable relief and surveys
the application of those principles within the context of the Williams Act.
Part III addresses the Supreme Court's only decision on the subject,
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.'0 and proffers a means of reinterpreting
that decision to remedy the problems it has engendered. Part IV briefly
outlines additional corrective measures for remedying the
under-enforcement of the Williams Act.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that a shift toward more predictable
and stringent remedies in response to violations of the Williams Act,
coupled with a cause of action against any corporate management that is
dilatory in reporting violations of the Act, would better serve the ends of
the statute by strengthening the incentives for insurgents to comply with
the Act and for incumbent management to report instances of
noncompliance.
I. THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. Background, Legislative History, and Purposes
Unlike the approaches taken by other nations, and by many U.S. states,
federal-securities law in the United States is primarily a disclosure-based
6. See infra text accompanying notes 106-10; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
7. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor
Suitability, 28 REV. BANKING & FiN. L. 581, 581-82, 626 (2009) (explaining that the
repercussions of the financial crisis make reform necessary and likely).
8. See Dennis K. Berman, SEC Examines Berkshire Disclosures, WALL ST. J., May 6,
2010, at Cl.
9. See Kara Scannell, Two Wyly Brothers Hit with Fraud Case from SEC, WALL ST.
J., July 30, 2010, at C1.
10. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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regime." Instead of regulating the merit of potential securities
transactions, U.S. securities law has traditionally regulated the disclosure
that must-and, in some cases, must not-be provided to and by the
parties involved.12
Providing quality, accurate information is considered essential for at
least two interrelated reasons: investor protection and the health of capital
markets. 13 In keeping with Congress's philosophical preference toward
disclosure and against merit regulation, securities laws protect investors by
requiring that they be furnished information deemed most critical to their
ability to protect themselves.14 Regarding the capital markets (and, indeed,
markets in general), few things are more important than price, and quality,
accurate information is essential to the market's pricing of securities.' 5
The importance of accurate information and pricing was vividly
underscored by the global economic recession that paralyzed world
financial markets from 2008-2009. Among the many causes associated
with this recession, commentators have repeatedly identified the lack of
quality information concerning critical economic transactions and the
inability to price assets accurately as primary causes.' 6
One category of information, which is particularly significant to
investors and the market alike, concerns corporate control because "[t]he
competence and integrity of a company's management, and of the persons
who seek management positions, are of vital importance to
stockholders."' Indeed, the market price of a security generally "reflects
an evaluation of the company based on the assumption that the present
management and its policies will continue."' 8 Thus, "[s]ecrecy in this area
is inconsistent with the expectations of the people who invest in the
securities of publicly held corporations and impairs public confidence in
securities as a medium of investment." 19
Not surprisingly, therefore, securities laws have long required the
disclosure of efforts undertaken to seize control of a corporation:
11. See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud from Economic and
Natural Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 122 (2007) (providing a brief background
on U.S. securities regulation).
12. See id
13. Id. at 121.
14. Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal
Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 781, 783-84 (1982).
15. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1081 (2003) (explaining that analysts' roles
in ensuring accurate disclosure information promotes accurate market pricing).
16. Kaal, supra note 7, at 581.
17. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812.
18. Id. at 4, 2813, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2813.
19. Id. at 2812, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2812.
[Vol. 60:311314
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Where one company seeks control of another by means of a
stock-for-stock exchange, the offer must be registered under the
Securities Act of 1933. The shareholder gets a prospectus setting
forth all material facts about the offer. He knows who the
purchaser is, and what plans have been made for the company.
He is thus placed in a position to make an informed decision
whether to hold his stock or to exchange it for the stock of the
other company.
Where corporate control is sought through a proxy contest, the
Securities Exchange Act requires that shareholders be informed
of the identity of the participants and their associates, their
shareholders and when they acquired them. When shares are
purchased with borrowed funds, the identity of the lender must
be disclosed if the funds were obtained otherwise than through a
bank loan or margin account. In both the exchange offer and the
proxy fight the information is filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and is subject to statutory requirements
20
and sanctions.
However, as of 1968, not all efforts at seizing corporate control were
covered by the securities acts' disclosure requirements.21 Importantly, a
simple cash tender offer22 was not subject to reporting obligations under
either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23
Similarly, disclosure was not required of those who would simply purchase
large quantities of a company's stock via privately negotiated cash
20. Id. at 2812-12, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2812-13.
21. Thomas L. Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling
Shareholders-Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-and a Proposal, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1047 (1977) (detailing how, through the use of tender offers,
individuals could evade disclosure requirements and attempt corporate takeovers prior to the
enactment of the Williams Act in 1963).
22. Interestingly, the Williams Act does not define the term "tender offer." See 14A
GUY P. LANDER, U.S. SECURITIES LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
AND CAPITAL MARKETS, § 11:14, at 11-42 (2d ed. 2009). The SEC and courts have adopted
an eight-factor test for determining whether a stock purchase constitutes a tender offer:
(a) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of
an issuer; (b) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
(c) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (d) firm
rather than negotiable offer terms; (e) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed
minimum number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number of shares to
be purchased; (f) offer open only a limited period of time; (g) pressure on offerees
to sell their stock; and (h) public announcements of a purchasing program
concerning the target that precede or accompany the rapid accumulation of large
amounts of the target's securities.
Id
23. Chang-Do Gong, The Williams Act Amendments-Controlling Shareholders and
Tender Offers, in 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 7A.01, at 7A-4 to 7A-5
(A. A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 2002).
2011] 315
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transactions or open-market cash sales of stock.24  Compounding the
problem, these undertakings could be, and often were, pursued quite
effectively together.2 5
These loopholes were significant because they enabled "large
accumulations of an issuer's shares and cash tender offers to be
accomplished in complete secrecy." 26 Such accumulations undermined the
objective of ensuring adequate disclosure to both investors and the market
regarding "a potential shift in corporate control"27 and, correspondingly,
impeded the ability of investors and the market to "adequately evaluate the
company's worth."28 The loopholes gained practical significance in the
1960s, when the cash tender offer had "become an increasinly favored
method of acquiring control of publicly held corporations." 2 In 1960,
there were only eight cash tender offers for publicly held corporations, but
in 1966, there were over one hundred cash tender offers for such
-30
corporations.
In 1965, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey began his fight to
close these loopholes.3 That year he drafted legislation providing that
"any substantial accumulation of shares of a company registered under the
[1934 Securities Exchange] Act must be preceded by the filing of public
,,32information. That was, he argued, "the only way that corporations, their
stockholders, and employees [could] adequately repare[] in advance to
meet the threat of the takeover specialist." Although initially
24. See id.
25. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 202, 205-07 (1989) (detailing the effective strategy known as "street sweeps" that
combines the purchase of a large quantity of a company's stock with tender offers).
26. Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 n.10 (D. Del. 1982).
27. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
28. Id
29. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2811.
A cash tender offer
normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company-
usually at a price above the current market price. Those accepting the offer are
said to tender their stock for purchase. The person making the offer obligates
himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered shares if certain
specified conditions are met.
Id
30. See id
3 1. Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 853, 859 (1971) [hereinafter Section 13(d) and Disclosure].
32. Id. (quoting 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965) (statement of Sen. Harrison A.
Williams, Jr.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id (quoting 111 CONG. REc. 28,259 (1965) (statement of Sen. Harrison A.
Williams, Jr.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 60:311316
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unsuccessful, 34 Senator Williams persisted, and in 1968, Congress assed
the legislation that would come to bear his name: the Williams Act.3 p
An important stumbling block to the legislation's passage was Senator
William's proposal to have any substantial accumulation of stock preceded
by a public-information filing. 36  Although per se workable for tender
offers, the SEC objected to this because it proved unworkable for
open-market and privately negotiated purchases of stock.37  The SEC
considered it impractical to require individuals and entities to disclose their
intention to purchase stock in a company beforehand, especially
38
considering the speed in which trading decisions are often made. Senator
Williams relented on this point, and the legislation was altered so that the
stock-accumulation provision would be triggered, not by plans to acquire
stock in the future, but rather by the present or past acquisition of a certain
threshold amount of stock.39
In total, the Williams Act added sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and
14(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 Consistent with his
original vision, the Act's ultimate purpose is "to require the disclosure of
pertinent information . . . when a person or group of persons seek to
acquire a substantial block of equity securities of a corporation by a cash
tender offer or through the open market or privately negotiated
purchases."4 1 Senator Williams also explained that such disclosure is
necessary in order that "shareholders and potential investors can
adequately evaluate a tender offer or the possible effect of a change in
substantial shareholders." 42
Similarly, the Senate Report of the Williams Act states Congress's
purpose as follows: "[to] correct the current gap in our securities laws by
amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide full disclosure in
34. See Section 13(d) and Disclosure, supra note 31, at 859.
35. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
36. Section 13(d) and Disclosure, supra note 31, at 859.
37. Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation J3d and the Regulatory
Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 131, 134-35 (1987).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 134.
40. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND
THE SECURITIES LAWS § 13.01[G][2], at 13-22 (4th ed. Supp. 2009).
41. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 102 (7th Cir. 1970) (quoting 113 CONG.
REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.)); see also Jacobs v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (D. Del. 1982) ("The purpose of Section 13(d) is to
provide shareholders and potential investors with information about a change in ownership
and control of the issuer to enable them to make informed investment decisions.").
42. See Section 13(d) and Disclosure, supra note 31, at 862 (quoting Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearing on S. 510 Before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 2-3 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.)) [hereinafter S. 510 Hearing].
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connection with cash tender offers and other techniques for accumulating
large blocks of equity securities of publicly held companies."4 3
As previously noted, the Williams Act addresses both outright purchases
of stock, whether on national exchanges or via private negotiation, and
tender offers." Section 13(d) of the Act contains the deficiency upon
which this Article focuses-the accumulation of securities via their
outright purchase.45
Before reviewing the text of the Act itself, one final thread from its
legislative history warrants attention. Congress was quick to stress that the
Williams Act was not to be interpreted or applied for the protection of
incumbent management, or to protect anyone else interested in gaining or
46
maintaining corporate control for that matter. Instead, "the sole purpose
of the Williams Act was the protection of investors,"4 7 and "Congress
expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management to
discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock which
would create the potential for such attempts. "48 As the Second Circuit
recalled: "the Act's draftsmen commented upon the 'extreme care' which
was taken 'to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."' 49
B. Text and Applicability
Since its passage in 1968, the Williams Act has undergone a few minor
amendments.50 As it exists today, the disclosure requirements of the Act
43. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2814;
S. REP. No. 90-550, at 4 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2814.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
45. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). This
Article is not concerned with tender offers per se, and, indeed, § 13(d) "has no application to
tender offers" directly. See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 40, §13.01[G], at 13-22.
46. Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D.N.J. 1985).
47. Id (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977)).
48. ICN Pharm., Inc. v. Khan, 2 F.3d 484, 491 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)). Interestingly, this was a shift in Senator
William's initial approach, as his earlier version of the Act was explicitly predicated upon
protecting incumbent management. James C. Wine, Private Litigation Under the Williams
Act: Standing to Sue, Elements ofa Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CORP. L. 545, 547-48 (1982).
49. ICNPharm., Inc., 2 F.3d at 491 (quoting Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58). The Williams
Act also added § 13(e) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which regulates the purchase or
securities by their issuer. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 455
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2006)).
50. See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT - TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK
ACCUMULATIONS §2:5, at 19-23 (2009) (setting forth the legislative history of the Williams
Act) [hereinafter JACOBS, THE WILLAMS ACT]. The most significant of these subsequent
amendments occurred in 1970, when the threshold amount of stock required to trigger the
Act's disclosure requirements was reduced from ten percent of any class outstanding to five
percent. Id. § 2.5, at 20.
[Vol. 60:311318
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are triggered when any investor or group of investors acting together
"acquir[es] more than 10 percent [now 5 percent] of any class of equity
security registered under the Securities Exchange Act."5  The purpose of
this structure is to prevent individuals from circumventing the Act's
disclosure provisions by dividing up a stock acquisition among several
different persons acting in concert.52
Once the five-percent threshold is reached, the acquiring party or parties
must, "within ten days after such acquisition," provide notice via
"registered or certified mail" to (1) "the issuer of the security"; (2) the
exchange or exchanges on which the security is traded; and (3) the SEC.
This notice is provided on a Schedule 13D form and must contain the
following information: (A) the identity and background of the acquiring
party or parties; (B) the source of funds used to purchase the securities; (C)
the purpose of the purchase of the securities; (D) the number of shares
beneficially owned by the acquiring party or parties; and (E) agreements
between the acquiring party or parties and others regarding any securities
of the issuer. 54
Perhaps the most critical provision is item C, which requires that the
purpose motivating the purchase be revealed. The relevant text of item C
requires that information be provided
if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to
acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any
plans or proposals which such persons may have to liquidate
such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other
persons, or to make anY other major change in its business or
corporate structure .... 5
51. Id at 19 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2814) (alteration in original). For the current text of this portion of the
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006).
52. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 8-9 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2818.
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006). A
commonly recognized deficiency with this structure is that, though the disclosure
requirement is triggered upon acquisition of five percent of a company's stock, by the time
the requisite disclosure reaches the market ten days later, a higher percentage of stock may
have accumulated. See Allen E. Kelinsky, Promoting Shareholder Equality in Stock
Accumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 93, 111 (1986). This
particular deficiency has been heavily discussed, and, though important, is beyond the scope
of this Article. See id. at 111, 123-25.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2010); see also Kelinsky, supra note 53, at 99 n.4
(discussing the requirements of § 13(d)).
55. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C). The
reference to "prospective purchases" is apparently an unfortunate carryover from the original
bill introduced by Senator Williams, which would have triggered the disclosure requirements
when an individual planned to purchase securities. See S. 2731, 89th Cong. (1965) (showing
the "prospective purchases" language in the original Senate bill). As the Act's provisions
are currently triggered only by actual purchases, this verbiage appears inapplicable.
3192011]
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Significantly, the instructions to Schedule 13D are slightly broader on
this point than the authorizing text.56 Whereas the authorizing statutory
text requires qualifying acquirers of stock to report their plans with regard
to such acquisition if their ultimate goal is to gain control of a certain
business or securities issuer, the instructions to Schedule 13D include no
such qualifier.58 Instead, Item 4 of Schedule 13D instructs the acquirer to
"[s]tate the purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities of the
issuer."59 As Jonathan Macey and Jeffry Netter have noted:
Item 4 of the Schedule 13D (the form filed to comply with
section 13(d) and Rule 13d) goes a bit beyond the requirements
of the statute, adding that the purchaser "state the purpose or
purposes of the acquisition of securities" and "describe any plans
or proposals which the reporting persons may have which relate
to or would result in certain" enumerated types of changes in the
- * 60
management, composition, operation and policies of the issuer.
The notice provisions of the Williams Act set forth the information that,
in Congress's estimation, best enables investors to assess the likelihood of
a change in corporate control and to undertake its valuation.6 1  Notably,
Congress's concerns over the importance of this information were not
62
merely hypothetical. Detailed analysis of stock returns following the
filing of a Schedule 13D suggest that such filings result in statistically
significant stock-price movement.63
Exceptions to the § 13(d) disclosure requirements are provided for
acquisitions deemed unproblematic because either sufficient information
56. This potential violation of administrative-law principles apparently has not been
challenged. See Michael Douglas Jacobs, Illuminating a Bureaucratic Shadow World:
Precedent Decisions Under Calfornia's Revised Administrative Procedure Act, 21 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 247, 277-78 (2001) (discussing the limits on and parameters of
rulemaking and noting that "[a]dministrative agencies have only the powers expressly or
implicitly granted by their enabling statutes or the Constitution").
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (2006).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2010).
59. Id
60. See Macey & Netter, supra note 37, at 136 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101).
Additionally, "13D investors must file amendments to the original Item 4 in the event that
there is 'any material change in the facts set forth in prior filings."' Id (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-101).
61. Cf Macey & Netter, supra note 37, at 138-45 (setting forth the benefits of Item 4
disclosures and questioning the favorability of Williams Act disclosure requirements in
certain circumstances because of the significant costs associated with such disclosure).
62. Macey & Netter, supra note 37, at 133-35.
63. See Gerald P. Madden, Potential Corporate Takeovers and Market Efficiency: A
Note, 36 J. FIN. 1191, 1191-95 (1981); Wayne H. Mikkelson & Richard S. Ruback, An
Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Investment Process, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 523, 523
(1985).
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has been or will be provided to investors, or because the acquisition does
not reasonably implicate a potential change in corporate control.64 An
exception is also recognized for those individuals who, or entities which,
acquired the securities "in the ordinary course of . .. business" and without
the purose or effect of "changing or influencing the control of the
issuer. 2 For such individuals, the required informational disclosure is
reduced.66
C. Enforcement
Although the requirements of the Williams Act are fairly clear, the
repercussions flowing from a violation of the Act are not.
A Williams Act violation can be addressed by any of the following: (a)
an SEC administrative action; (b) an SEC civil action; (c) a criminal action
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice; or (d) private litigation.67
Although this may seem sufficient to deter violators, a review of the case
law demonstrates the relative toothlessness of this enforcement regime.68
As a result, the incentive to comply with the Act's disclosure requirements
or for incumbent management to report violations promptly is relatively
weak.69
The status quo is unsatisfactory because the harms occasioned by a
Williams Act violation are serious. The simple fact that Congress has
required such disclosure gives rise to a presumption of materiality. As
Manning Warren explained:
64. The relevant exceptions apply to
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or proposed to be made
by means ofa registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 . . ;
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, together with
all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during the
preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security;
(D) any acquisition . . . not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the
effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)(6)(A)-(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(A-(D) (2006).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)(5); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1) (2010).
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(5); 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1) (2010).
67. Security Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(b)(6), 21-21C, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a(b)(6), 78u
to 78u-3; see also Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement
Perspective, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 559 n.114 (2008) (listing succinctly the applicable means
with which to address a violation).
68. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
70. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition And Corporate Counsel, 56
SMU L. REv. 885, 904 (2003). And "material," for securities-law purposes, means "there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important.. . . Put
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The regulatory presumption of materiality arises from the
disclosure requirements imposed upon publicly-held
corporations by the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, and by the SEC's
rules and forms under both statutes. Because Congress and the
SEC have made policy decisions resulting in specific mandatory
disclosure of certain types of information, a strong presumption
exists that information specifically required to be disclosed is
material. Accordingly, "lawyers can safely assume that required
disclosure items may be presumed to be material."
This presumption of materiality has been applied to the Williams Act, by
72 73both commentators and courts. Additionally, the presumption is
particularly justifiable in this context because
irreparable harm is present if the investing public and the present
shareholders of [a target company] are trading in a market place
which is deprived of important and legally required information
as to the acquiring group's intentions which may affect their
judgment as to whether the stock should be sold, bought, or
held.74
As previously indicated, the statistically significant movement of stock
prices, ordinarily after the filing of a Schedule 13D, strongly supports this
presumption of materiality.
To underscore the seriousness of a 13(d) violation, Judge Milton Pollack
of the Southern District of New York remarked:
Section 13(d) is not a mere "technical" reporting provision; it
is, rather, the "pivot" of a regulatory scheme that may represent
"'the only way that corporations, their shareholders and others
can adequately evaluate . . . the possible effects of a change in
substantial shareholdings."' 7 6
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
71. Warren, supra note 70, at 904 (internal citations omitted) (quoting RICHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1010 (8th ed. 1998)).
72. See Albert F. Li, The Meaning of Item Four of Schedule 13d of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A New Framework and Analysis, 52 Bus. LAW. 851, 851-52 (1997).
73. See Mates v. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 814, 823-24 (D. Md. 1999);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Icahn, 609 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
74. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
75. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
76. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 & n.21
(D.C. Cir. 1989)). An additional authority explains that,
[a]lthough Section 13(d) is essentially a disclosure statute, an issuing
corporation's remedies for a Section 13(d) violation are not limited to curative
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1. Administrative Proceedings
The SEC is the federal administrative agency charged with enforcing
U.S. securities law.n Although not historically the case, today the SEC
has broad and potent authority to remedy a securities-law violation.78
Among other capabilities, the SEC "has authority to
[impose] . . . administrative cease-and-desist orders, disgorgement with
prejudgment interest, civil monetary penalties, [and] remedial
undertakings." 79 These penalties generally serve both compensatory and
deterrent functions.80
Under federal-securities law, "[t]he Commission is vested with [the]
authority to conduct any investigation it deems necessary to determine
whether a person has violated federal securities laws and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder."81 These powers are broad, ranging
from informal inquiries to the issuance of subpoenas, 82 and have been
delegated to the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. 83
Upon its discovery of a federal-securities law violation, the SEC must
decide how to proceed. Although the SEC's initial enforcement program
was chiefly remedial, it has recently adopted a more deterrent-based and
disclosure. The purpose of the reporting requirement in Section 13(d) is to insure
that public shareholders facing a tender offer or the acquisition by a third party of
a controlling block of shares may obtain adequate information about the
qualifications and intentions of the acquiring person. Thus, the ultimate purpose
of Section 13(d) is to protect shareholders. Filing a completely truthful Schedule
13D does not necessarily remedy the injuries suffered by shareholders who relied
on the misstatements or omissions in the original Schedule 13D.
USG Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, 690 F. Supp. 625, 627 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citations omitted).
77. See Jerry J. Campos, Avoiding the Discretionary Function Rule in the Madoff
Case, 55 LOY. L. REv. 587, 603-04 (2009).
78. See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded
Investors?, 63 Bus. LAW. 317, 320-22 (2008) ("For much of the SEC's existence its
statutory remedies were very limited. . . ."); Harvey L. Pitt et al., SEC Enforcement Actions:
An Overview of SEC Enforcement Proceedings and Priorities, C700 A.L.1.-A.B.A. COURSE
OF STUDY 167, 201 (1991) ("The SEC has broad statutory authority to conduct such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person or entity has violated,
is currently violating, or is about to violate, the provisions of the federal securities laws or
rules. . . .").
79. Thomsen et al., supra note 67, at 559 n.l 14 (citing Security Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 15(b)(6), 21-21C, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a(b)(6), 78u to 78u-3 (2006)).
80. Black, supra note 78, at 323-24.
81. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of
the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 367, 371-72 (2008).
82. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, Overview of an SEC Enforcement
Proceeding, in 2 30TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 597, 606-36
(1998).
83. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 81, at 372.
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punitive focus.84 Accordingly, after an investigation, the SEC can opt not
to impose a remedy, or it may effectuate an administrative remedy, 86a
civil remedy, or, via referral to the U.S. Department of Justice, a criminal
remedy.8 8 The path selected depends on the severity of the wrongdoing
and the strength of the evidence.
In the context of Williams Act violations, the most relevant among the
SEC's administrative remedies are the powers afforded it
under §§ 15(c)(4) and 21C of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.90 Section
15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act empowers the Securities and
Exchange Commission, "after notice and opportunity for hearing," to
"publish its findings" regarding a violation of § 13(d) and issue an order to
the violating individual demanding that he comply or take "steps to effect
compliance, with such provision or such rule or regulation thereunder upon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may
specify in such order."91 Importantly, unlike some of the SEC's other
administrative powers,92 § 15(c)(4) extends to "any person," thereby
authorizing the SEC to invoke its corresponding powers against individuals
not ordinarily subject to SEC regulations. 93
The effectiveness of § 15(c)(4) has long been undermined, however, by
the fact that a violation of that section "does not result in any penalty other
than a court order directing compliance." 94 Recognizing this, Congress, in
its 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act,
84. Id. at 383.
85. Pitt et al., supra note 78, at 7 (noting that the Commission is authorized the decide
whether or not to bring an action).
86. Id. at 185.
87. Id. at 147.
88. See id at 53; infra text accompanying note 128.
89. See Pitt et al., supra note 78, at 7; see also Div. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 2:1:1, at 11 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf; Terrance O'Malley et al., An Overview of the SEC
Enforcement Process, MANAGED FUND ASS'N REP., Aug./Sept. 2007; Tammy Whitehouse,
Past, Present, and Future of SEC Enforcement Policy, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Mar. 9, 2010,
http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5834/past-present-and-future-of-sec-enforcement-
policy.
90. See 5E ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAWS §§ 20:131-132, at 20-404 (2010) [hereinafter JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES];
see also Security Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(c)(4), 21C, 15 U.S.C. §§ 780(c)(4), 78u-3(a)
(2006).
91. Security Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4).
92. For example, Rule 2(e), § 12(j), and § 12(k) are restricted to regulated entities. See
JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, §§ 20:126, 20:129-20:130, at 20-402
to 20-403.
93. Id., supra note 90, § 20:131, at 20-404.
94. S. REP.NO. 101-337, at 18 (1990).
[Vol. 60:311324
Effectuating Disclosure Under the Williams Act
amended the 1934 Securities Exchange Act by adding § 21C.95 Section
21C empowers the SEC to issue cease-and-desist orders96 and authorizes
the judiciary to "impose a civil monetary penalty, a mandatory injunction,
or both for a violation" of such an order. Armed with § 21C, the SEC
has little incentive to resort to its more limited powers under Section
15(c)(4), which, in the words of one commentator, has been rendered an
"unimportant tool."9 Thus, in the face of a Williams Act violation, the
SEC may issue a cease-and-desist order under its own administrative
authority. 99 Such an order could, for example, mandate that the violator
cease violating the Williams Act and file the requisite Form 13D. 00
The Securities Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990 also included a
provision enabling the SEC to levy monetary 1enalties in administrative
proceedings, but under limited circumstances. More specifically, these
amendments permitted the SEC to levy monetary penalties against
broker-dealers, municipal-securities dealers, government-securities
brokers, government-securities dealers, clearing agencies, and transfer
agents.102 Accordingly, even following the Securities Enforcement
Remedies Act of 1990, the SEC did not have the authority to assess a
monetary penalty for a Williams Act violation per se, but could do so if
such violation were coincidentally committed by a regulated person.'o3
Similarly, the 1990 amendments included a provision granting the SEC
authority to require disgorgement in an administrative proceeding in which
the SEC possesses authority to levy monetary penalties.1 04  Thus, the
95. See JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:132, at 20-404 to
20-405 (citing S. REP. No. 101-337, at 18 (1990)). See generally Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931.
96. See JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:132, at 20-404 to
20-405
97. Id
98. See id § 20:131, at 20-404. Under § 21(a)(1), the SEC may "investigate violations
of the 1934 Act or the rules thereunder, and [to] publish a report of its findings." See
id. § 20:127, at 20-402 to 20-403. Some have described this power as "ineffective." Id.
99. GARY M. BROWN, SODERQUIST ON THE SECURITIES LAWS § 11:4.1, at 11-12 (5th
ed. 2007).
100. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:107, at 316-18.
101. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:133, at 20-411; see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2006).
102. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:133, at 20-411; see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2 1(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2.
103. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:133, at 20-411; see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2 1(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2e, 80a-4(e), 80b-3(j); see also Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 82,
at 641-42 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2e, 80a-4(e), 80b-3(j)) (discussing the SEC's power to
order disgorgement and noting that it never before enjoyed that authority); Iichard A. Spehr
& Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What Is Its Relevance Today? I
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUs. 587, 593 (2005) ("The Remedies Act also authorizes the SEC to order
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availability of the SEC's power to administratively disgorge a Williams
Act violator has long been dependent upon the nature of the violator. 05
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010106 has significantly changed this status quo.' 0 7 Section 929P of the
Act, aptly entitled "Strengthening Enforcement by the Commission,"
empowers the SEC to impose a civil penalty against any person found to
have violated any provision of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which
includes the Williams Act, within the context of a section 21C
proceeding. 08  Therefore, as of July 21, 2010,109 the SEC can punish
anyone found to have violated the Williams Act in a section 21C
administrative proceeding by means of a civil penalty or a cease-and-desist
order. 110
2. SEC Civil Action
In addition to administrative remedies, the SEC is authorized to pursue
civil remedies in federal court against securities-law violators.1"1 As with
the SEC's administrative powers, this authority was significantly expanded
by the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990.112
As things currently stand, § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive relief "upon a proper showing" with
regard to "any person engaged" or "about to engage" in "acts or practices
constituting a violation of any provision of' the Securities Exchange
Act." 3  Section 21(d) also authorizes the SEC to seek a judgment for
monetary damages "upon a proper showing" that "any person has violated
the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains in administrative proceedings in which the SEC has
authority to impose monetary penalties.").
105. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
106. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.).
107. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 5, at i (discussing the impact of
the Act and calling it "the greatest legislative change to financial supervision since the
1930s").
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P, 124 Stat. at
1862 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 77h-1).
109. See Jesse Lee, President Obama Sings Wall Street Reform: "No Easy Task," THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/
president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
110. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a)(1), 124
Stat. at 1862 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 77h-1).
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21(d)(1), 21(d)(3), 21(d)(5), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u(d)(3), 78u(d)(5) (2006).
112. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 104, at 588-89 (discussing the expansion of
the sanctions available to the SEC).
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1).
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any provision of' the Act or the rules or regulations promulgated
thereunder.114 This is in addition to the SEC's longstanding authority to
seek disgorgement under certain circumstances.1 5
Although the SEC may administratively impose a cease-and-desist order
enjoining further violation of the Williams Act," more creative remedies
may be crafted if the SEC pursues injunctive relief in federal court." 7 For
example, in addition to an order of disgorgement, the SEC has obtained
an order sterilizing the voting rights of shares acquired in connection with
a violation of the Williams Act 119 and an order for rescission of sales of
shares also made in connection with a violation of the Williams Act.120
Indeed, courts have recognized the authority to grant "all necessary relief'
within such contexts. 121
In granting the SEC's requests for injunctive relief, courts have
enunciated the following guiding principles:
- Courts need not award an injunction under all
circumstances
- Trial courts have discretion to grant or to deny injunctions
- Equitable considerations should be a part of a trial judge's
determination
- Injunctions are designed to deter rather than to punish
- A judge can mould each decree
114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A).
115. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 104, at 587.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(f)(1), 80b-3(k)(1).
117. See JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:107, at 20-319 to
20-322, 20-342 to 20-346.
118. See Black, supra note 78, at 320-21.
119. SEC v. Gen. Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1259-60 (D.D.C. 1975).
120. Clearfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Omega Fin. Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 325, 347 (W.D.
Pa. 1999); see also SEC v. Tex. Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1255 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(recognizing, although not exercising, the SEC's authority to order rescission as a remedy to
a Williams Act violation). Unfortunately, "there is little written as to what factors a court
should consider to determine whether to order rescission, or to require the defendant to offer
rescission." JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:110, at 20-366.
Arnold Jacobs suggests that the "controlling factors should be those a court uses to decide
whether to grant or to deny disgorgement." Id. In particular, Jacobs notes:
Two points should guide courts here: (1) courts justify disgorgement on the
grounds that the purposes of the 1934 Act would be defeated if defendants kept
their profit and that disgorgement makes violations unprofitable. These two
grounds (plus the Rule's underlying policies) join to form one point courts should
use. (2) Since disgorgement could be considered a form of mandatory injunction,
at least some factors courts weigh to determine whether or not to award the SEC
an injunction also are germane.
Id. § 20:109, at 20-354 to 20-355.
121. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:108, at 20-349 to
20-350.
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- Flexibility rather than rigidity is its characteristic
- Mercy and practicality are its qualities
- Injunctions should be used to ensure a nice adjustment
between the public interest and private needs.122
Additionally, most courts have recognized that private litigants have
standing to sue for injunctive relief.123 Unlike private litigants, however,
the SEC has certain advantages in civil litigation. Although the SEC "is
subject to the general requirements of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" in its pursuit of injunctive relief, 124 the SEC need not allege or
prove irreparable injury or an inadequate remedy at law 125-a critically
important advantage for reasons that will become clear.
126
3. Criminal Prosecution
"The SEC frequently refers cases to and subsequently assists the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Attomeys" with criminal violations of
U.S. securities laws.127 This practice is explicitly authorized by § 21(d)(1)
of the 1934 Securities Act, which states that the SEC "may transmit such
evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as may
constitute a violation of any provision of [the 1934 Act] or the rules or
regulations thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion,
institute the necessary criminal proceedings."1 28
Section 21(d)(1) should be read in conjunction with § 32(a), which
criminalizes any willful violations of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.129
Section 32(a) also criminalizes any knowingly false or misleading material
statement in a document filed pursuant to the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act. 130
122. Id. § 20:107, at 20-320 to 20-322 (citations omitted).
123. See infra Part I.C.4.
124. Pitt et al., supra note 78, at 150.
125. See id. at 151 ("It is not necessary ... for the Commission to demonstrate an
irreparable injury or an inadequate legal remedy."); see also JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND
REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:107, at 20-325 ("[M]ost courts hold that the Commission
need not allege or prove irreparable injury or lack of a legal remedy to get a preliminary or
permanent injunction." (citations omitted)).
126. See infra Part II.A.
127. Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 82, at 662.
128. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006).
129. Security Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); see JACOBS,
DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:161, at 20-479 to 20-482 (discussing
criminal penalties for violations in general). Whether a violation of the 1934 Act is "willful"
varies by court, with some jurisdictions requiring specific intent and other jurisdictions
predicating criminal liability upon recklessness. Id.
130. See JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:161, at 20-479 to
20-482.
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Therefore, the Department of Justice may criminally prosecute
violations of the Williams Act.' 3 A party's willful failure to file a
Schedule 13D form would be a criminal violation, as well as a party's
decision to file a materially and knowingly false or misleading Schedule
13D.132 Criminal prosecutions for failing to make required disclosures
under the securities laws are, however, exceedingly rare. 3
4. Private Rights ofAction
Although the Williams Act "does not, by its terms, create a right of
action in favor of any private party to redress a violation" of the Act, 134
within two years of the Act's promulgation a court recognized such a
right,'35 and within three years courts also recognized issuers as holders of
this right.136
This right to redress violations of the Williams Act does not extend to all
actors under all circumstances, however. The critical question for the
purposes of this Article is: who has standing to sue on account of a party's
failure to timely file a Schedule 13D?
The Supreme Court ruled on Williams Act standing by applying the
following rule: "where congressional purposes are likely to be undermined
absent private enforcement, private remedies may be implied in favor of
131. Edward F. Greene et al., Toward a Cohesive International Approach to
Cross-Border Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823, 835 (1997); see also Carolyn
C. Lavecchia & R. Stephen Nelson, Jr., Note, Dan River Inc. v. Icahn: Disclosure
Violations-Relief for Subject Management?, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 375, 399 (1984)
(explaining that the SEC cannot "initiate criminal proceedings sua sponte," but must refer
cases to the Department of Justice for prosecution); JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra
note 50, § 2:88, at 289 ("[T]he failure to file a Schedule 13D when due or filing an
inaccurate Schedule 13D can give rise to criminal charges under Section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act. . . .").
132. See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing the
"duty to file" and noting that "criminal penalties are available against one who knowingly
makes a false and misleading statement of material fact on a document required to be filed
by the securities laws").
133. Lavecchia & Nelson, supra note 131, at 399.
134. Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D.N.J. 1985). Notably, § 18(a)
of the 1934 Securities Exchange creates an express right of action for anyone who relies
upon a false or misleading statement in a document filed under the 1934 Act. JACOBS, THE
WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 289. Thus, an express right of action exists under
§ 18(a) for false or misleading schedule-I 3D filings in violation of the Williams Act. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
135. See Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding
that a private plaintiff, as securities purchaser, stated a cause of action against the defendant
for failing to disclose interests owned in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
136. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Bath Indus.,
Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 111 (7th Cir. 1970) (failing to address or question an issuer's
standing).
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the particular class intended to be protected by the statute."l 37 And, within
the context of the federal-securities laws, private enforcement has long
been seen as a necessary supplementation to SEC enforcement.138 In
applying this rule to the Williams Act, courts have determined that the Act
exists to "protect shareholders and prospective investors."' 3 9  As such,
current and rospective shareholders have standing to sue for Williams Act
violations.
Courts have also held that a target issuer, that is, the company whose
stock is being acquired, has standing to sue under § 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.141 Although issuers have not been deemed part of
the class intended for protection under the Williams Act, they have been
granted standing to sue on the theory that such standing serves the
protection of shareholders1 42 and because issuers are often in the best
position to detect and litigate Williams Act violations.143  For similar
reasons, at least one court has held that a tender offeror also has standing to
sue under § 13(d). 144
Interestingly, successful plaintiffs in § 13(d) suits are not ordinarilX5
entitled to monetary damages awards, regardless of their injuries.
137. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1977). For a review of how
the Court's approach to implied rights of action have changed over time, see Susan J.
Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private
Rights ofAction, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864-69 (1996).
138. Piper, 430 U.S. at 25.
139. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:7, at 23 & n.2 (including a list of
cases supporting the idea that the purpose of the section is to protect shareholders).
140. Id §2:88, at 295-96.
141. See Richard C. Morrissey, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, E.ON AG et al. v.
Acciona, S.A. et al: U.S. Federal District Court Takes Jurisdction of Dispute Among
European Parties Concerning Contest for Control of Endesa, S.A., in PLI's SixTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE: A CONTRAST IN EU AND US
PROVISIONS 393, 396 (2007) (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 65 (1975);
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 621 n.9 (2d Cir.
2002)).
142. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 289-90.
143. See Joy Flowers Conti et al., Claims Trafficking in Chapter I1-Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281, 335 (1992) (noting that courts have held that
targets and bidders can seek equitable remedies because they "[have] the expertise and the
incentive to seek such relief at a time when equitable relief could be effective").
144. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 295-96 (citing Torchmark
Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070, 1078-79 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff had
standing to sue defendant shareholders accused of violating § 13(d) of the Williams Act by
failing to file a Schedule 13D after defendants allegedly decided to act in concert, thereby
crossing the five-percent ownership threshold as a group)).
145. See JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 292-93 ("[J]udges
have been virtually uniform in denying a Section 13(d) private right of action for damages
regardless of the plaintiffs status."); see also Motient Corp. v. Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 536
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Whether monetary damages can be awarded depends on whether the
defendant filed a false or misleading Schedule 13D, in which case damages
are available, as opposed to cases in which no Schedule 13D was filed and
damages are not available.146 This curiosity results from the courts'
reading of the Williams Act in light of § 18(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.147 Section 18(a) provides a damages remedy for violations
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act that involve materially false or
misleading statements. 148 Although filing a fraudulent Schedule 13D falls
within the scope of § 18(a), the failure to file a Schedule 13D does not.149
Thus, when confronted with a private right of action predicated upon the
failure to file a Schedule 13D, courts have uniformly eschewed awarding
damages, and have opted instead for injunctive or other equitable relief.150
II. EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT
As discussed, courts have declined to apply a damages remedy for
failure to file a Schedule 13D on the grounds that such a remedy would be
inconsistent with the primary purpose of the Williams Act.'5 ' Instead, the
relief granted has invariably been injunctive or equitable in nature.152 This
Part will explore equitable relief in more detail, starting with the principles
of equitable relief in general, then turning to the application of those
principles within the context of a violation of§ 13(d) of the Williams Act.
(5th Cir. 2008) ("No other Circuit has found a private right of action for money damages
under Section 13(d).").
146. See JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 294 (noting the Act's
silence regarding a right of action for damages and discussing how courts have interpreted
such).
147. Id.
148. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
149. See Conti et al., supra note 143, at 355 (noting that § 18(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action for fraudulent Schedule 13D filings, but
not for failure to file a schedule 13D).
150. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:88, at 291-93. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has commented:
[s]ince any material misstatement or omission to an investor who purchases or
sells the security and actually relies on that information gives rise to a private
cause of action under Section 18(a) of the Exchange Act, . . . Section 18(a)
provides the sole basis for a private right of action for damages resulting from a
violation of Section 13(d).
Motient Corp. v. Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
151. See Conti et al., supra note 143, at 334-35 (1992) (discussing courts' refusal to
issue damages remedies for violations of the Williams Act, noting, in particular, that
"permitting such a remedy would be inconsistent with the prime purpose of the Williams
Act"); see also JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:3, at 13-18 (noting the
purpose of the Act and discussing the filing of a Schedule 13D); supra text accompanying
notes 139-43.
152. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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A. Equitable ReliefPrinciples
Federal courts possess the authority to grant equitable, injunctive relief
to resolve disputes before them.15 3 This discretion is bound, however, by
certain traditional principles.' 54 Among these is the notion that injunctions
are "designed to deter, not to punish."155  The Supreme Court has
explained: "Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [the
injunction]. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims." 56
In applying these principles to securities cases, one commentator has
identified the following salient holdings:
- An injunction need not be granted in every instance
- The trial court has discretion to issue an injunction
- Equity should guide courts in granting or withholding
injunctions
- Injunctions are designed to deter rather than to punish
- A trial judge has the power to mould each decree to the
necessities of the situation
- Injunctions are a flexible remedy [and]
- Mercy and practicality have made injunctions the instrument
for nice adjustment of the litigants' rights.157
Additionally, it should be noted that courts have expressed a greater
willingness to order prohibitory relief-in which a defendant is ordered to
refrain from certain actions-over affirmative relief-in which a defendant
is directed to undertake certain actions.Iss And because injunctive relief is
considered "extraordinary" by nature, all such remedies are granted
"sparingly" by the courts.
In assessing the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the circuit courts
have employed different tests.160 Further, the test that is applied differs
153. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943) ("An appeal to the equity
jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which
guides the determinations of courts of equity." (citation omitted)).
154. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (emphasizing the
importance of a court's discretion to issue an injunction and noting that Congress may
expressly limit this discretion).
155. Id.
156. Id
157. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:90, at 20-270 to 20-271
(internal citations omitted).
158. Id. § 20:90, at 20-271 to 20-272.
159. Id. § 20:91, at 20-297.
160. See id § 20:91, at 20-275 to 20-280 (outlining the test each circuit court applies).
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depending on whether the injunction sought is preliminary versus
permanent.161
Within the context of a Williams Act violation, both forms of injunctive
relief are applicable. Because such violations are often time sensitive,
parties frequently rush to court seeking preliminary injunctions to enjoin
the violators from acquiring additional shares or to enjoin the occurrence
of a shareholder meeting or vote until such time as the Williams Act
violation has been cured. 62 Other times, the feared, potential effects of a
Williams Act violation may be sufficiently remote or may have already
been realized, thus making permanent injunctive relief a sensible
remedy.163  Accordingly, standards relevant to each form of injunctive
relief must be considered.
"[A] court will grant an injunction based on the strength of the plaintiffs
case and a showing of irreparable injury plus, in the case of some circuits,
the public interest and weighing the defendant's and plaintiffs harm if an
injunction were issued." 6  Where the injunction sought is permanent,
evaluating the strength of the plaintiffs case is not necessary because a
permanent injunction is granted after a proceeding on the merits has
already transpired.16 5
The strength of the plaintiff's case is largely a factual matter. Although
there are certainly legal issues that could arise when assessing whether an
individual or group violated the Williams Act by failing to file a Schedule
13D,166 for the most part the question of whether someone was required to
and subsequently failed to file a Schedule 13D would be rather easy to
resolve.
Of critical concern are the inquiries regarding irreparable injury, public
interest, and the harm to both the defendant and the plaintiff. Though these
are imbued with strong factual components, there are certain important
161. Id § 20:90, at 274-75. A preliminary injunction is a temporary measure designed
to preserve the status quo, or prevent continuing or threatened harm, prior to a proceeding on
the merits. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunction § 8, at 564-65 (2000). A permanent injunction is a
remedy granted after there has been a final hearing and a plaintiff succeeds on the merits,
and when the relief measures are deemed appropriate. Id. § 10, at 568.
162. See Lavecchia & Nelson, supra note 131, at 396 ("Because participants in a tender
offer need relief quickly, most cases under the Williams Act involve requests for preliminary
rather than permanent injunctive relief.").
163. See, e.g., Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment against a plaintiffs claim for an
injunction when the plaintiff overpaid for stock he purchased as a result of the defendant's
failure to file a Schedule 13D disclosing his ownership stake in excess often percent).
164. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:107, at 317.
165. See supra note 161.
166. See JACOBS, DiSCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, §§ 20:85-86, at 20-262
to 20-263 (discussing legal issues that could arise, such as third-party liability).
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legal presumptions that can be applied to tilt the scale in one direction or
the other.
Some of these presumptions involve the definition of important terms.
"Irreparable injury" is defined as "substantial injury to a material degree,
coupled with inadequacy of monetary damages."' 6 7  Additionally, the
"inadequacy" of monetary damages is not construed strictly, and a
"preliminary injunction may be appropriate when fixing damages is
unusually difficult or where the uncertainty as to the correct measurement
will result in a potentially great injustice to either party."l 68
The public-interest component is usually interpreted by courts in the
Williams Act context as relating to the furnishing of full and accurate
information to the public without unduly burdening a potential acquirer.169
The Second Circuit set forth the common approach to the public-interest
component by stating:
If [the offeror] is in fact proceeding in violation of
the . . . securities laws, a preliminary injunction would serve the
public interest as much as [the target company's] private interest.
In this regard, by asserting these claims, [the target company] is
assuming a dual role, including that of a private attorney general.
Since it is impossible as a practical matter for the government to
seek out and prosecute every important violation of laws
designed to protect the public in the aggregate, private actions
brought by members of the public in their capacities as investors
or competitors, which incidentally benefit the general public
interest, perform a vital public service.'ve
167. Id § 20:91, at 281.
168. Id § 20:91, at 283.
169. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1006 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that
Congress, in passing the Williams Act, effectuated an intent that takeovers "were not in the
public interest if effected through tender offers containing material misrepresentations");
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568-69 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that
the unconstitutional application of the Williams Act is against the public interest and that
shareholders' interests are protected by the Act's general policies).
170. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 687,
698-99 (2d Cir. 1973). The Court continued by saying:
As the Supreme Court said in JI. Case Co. v. Borak, private actions provide "a
necessary supplement" to actions by the government and "the possibility of civil
damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement"
of laws designed to protect the public interest. Therefore, as in actions brought by
the government, doubts as to whether an injunction sought is necessary to
safeguard the public interest . . . should be resolved in favor of granting the
injunction.
Id at 699 (internal citation omitted).
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Issues unrelated to these concerns have been held irrelevant to the
public-interest determination.171
With regard to weighing the harm to each defendant and plaintiff,
Arnold Jacobs compiled a helpful and comprehensive list of harms
credited by the courts within the tender-offer context-a field distinct
from, but often overlapping, that of nonpublic accumulations of stock on
open markets.172 As would be expected, the harms usually asserted by
potential acquirers revolve around the acquirer's inability to consummate
the acquisition. 173 Target issuers usually complain about the disruption to
management the potential takeover poses, and shareholders usually
complain about the effect of the potential takeover on stock
price--complaints that may weigh in favor of or against granting an
injunction.
B. Application ofEquitable Relief to Williams Act Violations
Plaintiffs-including the SEC in civil litigation 76-have sought many
forms of relief in Williams Act cases, including injunctions
[t]o correct an inaccurate Schedule 13D; to file a Schedule
13D when no Schedule 13D has been filed yet; to enjoin future
violations of Section 13(d); to enjoin purchases until disclosure
is made; to prohibit a tender offer; to impose a "cooling-off'
period on purchases once full disclosure is made; to require
divestiture of shares acquired; to offer rescission to persons who
sold to the defendant; to enjoin sales of the purchased shares; to
sterilize the vote of purchased shares; to enjoin solicitation of
proxies; to enjoin the holding of a stockholders meeting; to
enjoin attempts to influence the issuer; and to bar the defendants
from becoming officers or directors of a public company.1
171. See, e.g., Koppers Co., Inc. v. Am. Exp. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1406-07 (W.D.
Pa. 1988) (finding that "environmental concerns" and concerns regarding "jobs,
communities and families" were irrelevant in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in a
Williams Act case).
172. See JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES, supra note 90, § 20:91, at 20-285 to
20-294.
173. See id § 20:91, at 20-285 to 20-286 (listing the "[fjactors conserving the tender
offeror").
174. See id § 20:91, at 20-286 to 20-291 (listing the "[fjactors concerning the target
company").
175. See id § 20:91, at 20-290 to 20-291 (listing the "[f]actors concerning stockholders
of the target company").
176. See JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:108, at 324 ("The SEC can
bring an injunctive action for breaches of the Exchange Act.").
177. Id. §2:107, at 316.
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Courts, however, have been reluctant to grant many of the items on this
list.'78 Indeed, except in cases where the SEC is the plaintiff, courts often
deny relief altogether.179 A survey of the case law demonstrates that the
following responses largely encompass the courts' reactions to requests for
injunctive relief as a result of a § 13(d) violation:
Deny the relief requested as moot or otherwise unnecessary (a) if
compliance with § 13(d) has eventually been achieved and (b) if the
violation in question did not affect control of the corporation whose stock
purchase went unreported;' 80
Enjoin the annual shareholder meeting until such time as
accurate § 13(d) disclosures are made;'
178. See id. § 2:107, at 316-24 (discussing the various remedies and how courts have
treated them).
179. The SEC has often succeeded in procuring injunctive relief in the many cases it has
brought against violators of § 13(d) of the Williams Act. See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp.,
133 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming disgorgement remedy); SEC v. First City Fin.
Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d. 1215, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming disgorgement remedy); SEC v.
Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (granting
disgorgement and enjoining defendants from committing further § 13(d) violations); SEC v.
Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 124 (D.D.C. 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(granting disgorgement); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting disgorgement); SEC v. Zimmerman, 407 F. Supp. 623, 631
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. SEC v. Savoy Indus. Inc., 587 F.2d
1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ordering the filing of a Schedule 13(d)); SEC v. General Refractories
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1261 (D.D.C. 1975) (enjoining defendants from committing further
§ 13(d) violations). This could be a result of the strength of these cases, all of which include
alleged violations of other provisions of the securities laws in addition to § 13(d), or the
SEC's ability to proceed without a showing of irreparable harm. See supra text
accompanying notes 125-26.
180. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that injunctive relief was precluded because the Schedule 13D had already been
amended); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that, because the "purpose of § 13(d) had . . . been fulfilled," there was "no basis for
injunctive relief'); Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 97-98 (1st Cir. 1977)
(concluding that injunctive relief was precluded because the defendant eventually filed the
Schedule 13D and because there was no evidence of an "imminent contest for control" of the
corporation); Int'l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 F. Supp. 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding
that injunctive relief was not justified because the Schedule 13D was eventually filed);
Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("It is well-
settled that once the informative purpose of § 13(d) has been fulfilled by curative disclosure,
there is no risk of irreparable injury to shareholders and no basis for injunctive relief.");
Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1985) ("[T]he court finds that
defendants' amendments to their original Schedule 13D moots plaintiffs' charges in almost
all respects."); Condec Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting the
subsequent filing of the Schedule 13D after the law suit was filed); see also JACOBS, THE
WILLIAMS ACT, supra note 50, § 2:102, at 311 (explaining that "curing ... the breach will
moot the case").
181. See, e.g., Camelot Indus. Corp. v. Vista Res., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1174, 1184-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (enjoining a tender offer until the § 13(d) disclosures are made).
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Enjoin the § 13(d) violator from acquiring shares, soliciting proxies, or
making tender offers until the violation has been cured and adequate time
has passed to allow the information disclosed to be digested;182
Enjoin the § 13(d) violator from violating § 13(d) again in the future.' 83
Of these responses, the most common is the denial of relief on the
ground of mootness, as most § 13(d) violators cure their violations shortly
after being called to task.184 Though this is the case, some of these same
courts that denied relief have noted in dicta that their decisions might have
been different if they were faced with "an imminent contest for control" or
"shares rapidly acquired just before a contest for control following a
Section 13(d) violation,"' 8 thus holding out the promise of more stringent
relief.
Additionally, courts have explicitly acknowledged-if not outright
endorsed-some of the more severe forms of relief sought as potentially
appropriate remedies to a § 13(d) violation.186 Consider, for example,
182. See, e.g., ICN Pharm., Inc. v. Kahn, 2 F.3d 484, 489 (2d Cir. 1993) ("When . . . a
corrective filing is made and adequate opportunity is provided for the information that it
contains to be digested by shareholders, the corrective injunction should be terminated.");
K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 771 (D. Col. 1983) (holding that
members of the filing group shall be permanently enjoined from acquiring shares, soliciting
a proxy, or making a tender offer until thirty days after a corrected Schedule 13D is filed);
Cone Mills Corp. v. West. Pac. Indus., No. C-83-1181-G, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461, at
*42 (D.N.C. Dec. 23, 1983); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb, No. C 83-314, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15163, at *71-*72 (N.D. Ohio July 27, 1983) (holding that defendant must "cease and desist
from any and all actions" until thirty days after the court approves the Schedule 13D);
Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion, 507 F. Supp. 627, 636 (N.D.
Ala. 1981) (holding that the defendant "is enjoined from making any more purchases of [the
corporation's] stock until [the] amended Schedule 13D is filed"); W.A. Krueger Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 806 (D. Neb. 1979) (enjoining the
defendant from any action until he complies with § 13(d)); Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F.
Supp. 221, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enjoining the violator until a Schedule 13D is filed).
183. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d
511, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[P]laintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction restraining
future violations of §13(d). . . .").
184. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. Indeed, one judge has remarked that
the "scope of properly permissible relief' for a § 13(d) violation consists of "the prompt
filing of an adequate Schedule 13D, followed, perhaps, by a cooling-off period and other
limited, specific relief adapted carefully, cautiously, and expeditiously to the individual facts
of the particular case." Seilon, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *31.
185. Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 1977).
186. See Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970) (affirming a preliminary
injunction despite defendants' contention that it was "overly broad"); Jacobs v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1064 (D. Del. 1982) (noting the court's power to
disenfranchise a corporation's ability to direct a vote). But see Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport,
628 F. Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1985) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine circumstances in which the
extreme remedies of recision or sterilization of shares would be equitably warranted.");
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding no reason to
enjoin voting when the vote was not scheduled to occur for eight months).
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share sterilization, which is the disenfranchisement of those shares
acquired in violation of § 13(d).' Although rarely employed, courts have
long recognized the potential availability of such a remedy.'8 8 Further, at
least one other court has acknowledged that it "theoretically has the
equitable power to set aside . . . [a] shareholders' meeting if it finds
violations of the federal securities laws,"' 89 which would effectively
constitute an ex-post sterilization of shares.
The disconnect between the wide range of relief potentially available to
plaintiffs and the narrow range of relief ordinarily afforded is a function of
two factors: (1) the traditional grounds upon which equitable relief will be
granted; and (2) a misreading of the lead Supreme Court case on the
subject, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.190
III. RONDEA U V. MOSINEE PAPER CORP.
With regard to the Williams Act, the importance of Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp. cannot be overstated. Rondeau is the seminal Supreme Court
case interpreting § 13(d) and remedies for its violation. Rondeau, and
perhaps its misreading, has stymied the availability of more stringent
injunctive relief as a remedy for Williams Act violations, thereby
undermining the objectives of the Act.
A. Rondeau and Its Reinterpretation
The 1975 Supreme Court decision in Rondeau continues to supply the
most authoritative guidance with regard to the propriety and purpose of
187. See, e.g., CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (discussing, but not granting, share
sterilization); Med. Imaging Ctrs, of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, No. 96-0039-B, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22362, at *14-16 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996) (diluting, but not completely
sterilizing, the § 13(d) violator's voting rights).
188. See Bath Indus., 427 F.2d at 112 n.8 (delaying the disenfranchisement of
defendant-shareholders); Med. Imaging Ctrs. ofAm., Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 13-14
(noting that courts have the power "to subsequently 'fix' any damage caused by an
illegitimate change in control," but that such is not the preferable remedy if other
circumstances exist); Marshall Field & Co., 537 F. Supp. at 419 (noting that sterilization of
the shares could be granted after certain events occur); Jacobs, 549 F. Supp. at 1064 (noting
the court's power to disenfranchise a corporation). But see Hubco, Inc., 628 F. Supp. at 354
(implying that few situations, if any, warrant share sterilization). Interestingly, in Drobbin v.
Nicolet Instrument Corp., share sterilization was ordered as a remedy to state law violations,
thereby mooting the request for share sterilization as a remedy to an accompanying § 13(d)
violation. 631 F. Supp. 860, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Podesta v. Calumet Indus.,
Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,433, at 96,560 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(sterilizing defendant's shares on account of a breach of the "primary duty of fairness and
honesty," but not on account of the accompanying § 13(d) violation).
189. MTD Serv. Corp. v. Weldotron Corp., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,395, at 90,710 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994).
190. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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remedies for Williams Act violations.191 That this short decision of a
divided Court' 92 remains tremendously influential is unfortunate for a
variety of reasons. First, the case is filled with dicta that misstates the
Williams Act's legislative history and fails to fully appreciate the harms
that the Act was directed to protect against.193 Second, subsequent case
law has largely misconstrued Rondeau, reading the case to more
aggressively curtail the use of equitable relief than is necessary.194 Third,
and most importantly, Rondeau rested, in part, upon a presumption that no
longer holds-a presumption that aggrieved investors have recourse to a
suit for damages)-thus calling into question whether Rondeau even
remains good law.' 95  For these reasons, Rondeau can legitimately be
distinguished from most other cases, or alternatively, it may largely be set
aside.
The lawsuit in Rondeau was brought by Mosinee Paper Corporation
(Mosinee), which sought an award of substantial equitable relief against
Mr. Francis Rondeau on account of Rondeau's violation of § 13(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.196 Although Rondeau acquired more
than five percent of Mosinee's common stock by May 17, 1971, he did not
file the requisite Schedule 13D until August 25, 1971, approximately three
months beyond the ten-day deadline set by the Williams Act.'97 By the
time he filed his Schedule 13D on August 25, 1971, Rondeau had
accumulated approximately 7.5% of Mosinee's common stock.' 98
In his Schedule 13D, Rondeau disclosed that, although he originally
acquired shares in Mosinee for investment purposes, as of August 25,
1971, he decided to "acquire additional common stock . . . in order to
obtain effective control" of Mosinee.' 99
Mosinee alleged that Rondeau's tardy filing of his Schedule 13D harmed
investors "who had sold shares without the information which defendants
were required to disclose" and who therefore "lacked information material
to their decision whether to sell or hold."200 Consequently, Mosinee
191. See, e.g., CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the
impact of Rondeau on the availability of injunctive relief).
192. Six justices' views were expressed in the majority opinion delivered by Justice
Warren E. Burger, from which three justices dissented, Justices William 0. Douglas,
William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 49, 65. The decision
was sixteen pages long. See generally id
193. See infra text accompanying notes 230-31.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 237-44.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 269-75.
196. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 51-55.
197. Id. at 51-53.
198. Id. (noting that Rondeau had purchased sixty thousand of Mosinee's eight-hundred
thousand shares of stock).
199. Id. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id at 54-55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sought an injunction prohibiting Rondeau from voting or pledging his
Mosinee stock and from acquiring additional stock in Mosinee, as well as
to require Rondeau to divest his current holdings of Mosinee stock.20 1
Mosinee also sought money damages. 2 0 2
The Seventh Circuit summarizes Rondeau's response as follows:
Rondeau argued that his violation of section 13(d) did not
warrant the imposition of any remedy or equitable relief in view
of the following circumstances: He unknowingly and
unintentionally failed to file a Schedule 13D; his purchase of
eight percent of the common stock was for investment purposes,
not control; he did not formulate an intention to seek control of
Mosinee Paper until after he was informed by his attorney .. . of
the filing requirement under section 13(d); and he filed a
Schedule 13D within a reasonable time after learning of his duty
to file.203
Upon this record, the district court denied injunctive relief.204 In doing
so, the district court applied the traditional standards for determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief and exercised its discretion.205 Finding
no scienter on the part of Rondeau, and no damages to Mosinee or its
shareholders, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Rondeau. 206
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the
district court's findings in fact showed harm to Mosinee. 207 Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit held that Mosinee
need not show irreparable harm as a prerequisite to obtaining
permanent injunctive relief in view of the fact that as issuer of
the securities it is in the best position to assure that the filing
requirements of the Williams Act are being timely and fully
complied with and to obtain speedy and forceful remedial action
208
when necessary.
The Supreme Court took issue with the Seventh Circuit's decision,
granted certiorari, and reversed.209  In so doing, the Court properly
described the issue before it as a "narrow" one, and, accordingly, its
201. Id. at 55.
202. Id
203. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422
U.S. 49 (1975).
204. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 56.
205. Id. at 61-62.
206. Id at 55-56.
207. Id. at 56-57.
208. Mosinee Paper Corp., 500 F.2d. at 1017.
209. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 65.
210. Id. at 57.
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holding should be similarly interpreted as "narrow." More specifically, its
holding should be limited to its own articulation of why it granted
certiorari in the first place: "[w]e disagree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the traditional standards for extraordinary equitable relief
do not apply in these circumstances . . . ."11 Put differently:
[T]he District Court here was entirely correct in insisting that
[Mosinee] satisfy the traditional prerequisites of extraordinary
equitable relief by establishing irreparable harm. Moreover, the
District Judge's conclusions that [Rondeau] acted in good faith
and that he promptly filed a Schedule 13D when his attention
was called to this obligation support the exercise of the court's
sound judicial discretion to deny an application for an
injunction . . . .212
The Court's holding is difficult to interpret "narrowly" because of the
broad dicta that was included. Indeed, the trouble starts almost
immediately when the Court misstates the very issue before it as "whether
this record supports the grant of injunctive relief, a remedy whose basis 'in
the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of
legal remedies."' 213  As discussed, that is not exactly the issue to be
decided; the issue is not whether the record supports the grant of injunctive
relief, but rather whether the record-and the law-supports the reversal
of a denial of injunctive relief.
The Court criticized the Seventh Circuit for conflating "the questions of
liability and relief,"214 and held that the existence of a private right of
action under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act does not dispense with
the requirement that parties "satisfy the traditional prerequisites of
extraordinary relief by establishing irreparable harm." l The Court
explained that, on the record before it, such traditional prerequisites were
lacking.216 As the Court observed:
[Rondeau] has not attempted to obtain control of [Mosinee],
either by a cash tender offer or any other device. Moreover, he
has now filed a proper Schedule 13D, and there has been no
suggestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's requirement
of reporting any material changes in the information contained
therein. On this record, there is no likelihood that [Mosinee's]
shareholders will be disadvantaged should petitioner make a
211. Id
212. Id at 61-62.
213. Id at 57 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07
(1959)).
214. Id at 64.
215. Id at 61.
216. Id at 59.
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tender offer, or that respondent will be unable to adequately
place its case before them should a contest for control develop.217
Although the Court's holding is facially unproblematic, its application
creates some unfortunate and unnecessary difficulties.
With regard to the holding's application, the Court seriously
downplayed the harms of inadequate disclosure per se, and fixated on
tender offers as "the principal object of the Williams Act"218 to the
exclusion of secretive open-market stock accumulations. 219
Indeed, the Court went so far as to state that "none of the evils to which
the Williams Act was directed has occurred or is threatened in this
case." 220 Admittedly, not all of the evils to which the Williams Act was
directed occurred as there was no subsequent tender offer or change in
control, but whether none of the evils inspiring the Williams Act occurred
is a different matter. The Court's hyperbole here leads to error. As
previously discussed, the Williams Act was enacted so that "shareholders
and potential investors can adequately evaluate a tender offer or the
possible effect of a change in substantial shareholdings."22 1 Information
regarding a group or individual's acquisition of a five-percent stake or
greater in a company is important to shareholders regardless of whether a
tender offer or change of control actually transpires because of the effect
that this information has on stock prices.
In attempting to understand the Court's approach, it would help to bear
in mind that Rondeau was decided thirteen years before Basic v. Levinson,
which announced the Court's approval of the efficient capital-markets
hypothesis.223 This could partly explain the Court's failure to fully
appreciate the importance of the requisite disclosures mandated by the
Williams Act. Perhaps the Court would not opine similarly today.
Judge Parker captured the essence of the Williams Act well in his 1988
opinion in which he observed that "[s]ection 13(d) serves a vital public
function to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or
217. Id (internal citation omitted).
218. Id. at 60.
219. Recall the words of Senator Harrison A. Williams, who stated that the Act's
purpose was "to require the disclosure of pertinent information ... when a person or group
of persons seek to acquire a substantial block of equity securities of a corporation by a cash
tender offer or through the open market or privately negotiated purchases." Bath Indus.,
Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 102 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added) (quoting 113 CONG. REC.
24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.)).
220. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 59.
221. Section 13(d) and Disclosure, supra note 31, at 862 (emphasis added) (quoting S.
510 Hearing, supra note 42, at 2-3).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
223. 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). The hypothesis was that "the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information." Id.
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accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed."224  He
appropriately contextualized the Act as follows:
The Supreme Court reaffirmed only recently that a
fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, was "to protect investors against manipulation of stock
prices" and to implement a "philosophy of full disclosure." In
delivering the ruling, Justice Blackmun was addressing problems
of false statements and materiality under section 10(b) of the
Act. The same underlying principle applies to litigation arising
under section 13(d) of the Act which imposes strict disclosure
requirements where there are large scale accumulations of equity
225securities affecting corporate control.
The Court in Rondeau also erred when it declared that "the principal
object of the Williams Act is to solve the dilemma of shareholders desiring
to respond to a cash tender offer."226 Certainly, that was an object of the
227Williams Act, but not the only object2. Indeed, one could argue that there
are two parts to the Williams Act, one concerning tender offers, and
another concerning open-market stock accumulations. 228 Although these
parts can be and often are interconnected, the Court in Rondeau focused
solely on the former at the expense of the latter.229
Moreover, the Court gave no credit to the argument that the mere failure
to comply with the Williams Act gives rise to a prima facie case of
harm. Instead, the Court declared that "the fact that respondent is
pursuing a cause of action which has been generally recognized to serve
the public interest provides no basis for concluding that it is relieved of
showinp irreparable harm and other usual prerequisites of injunctive
relief." 31
The Court's explanation of the "traditional equitable principles"
232pertaining to injunctive relief only aggravates the issue2. On two
occasions the Court made a point of admonishing that injunctions were
,,233historically "designed to deter, not to punish. Rather than highlight
224. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 705, 725 (D.D.C. 1988) (emphasis
added).
225. Id. at 707 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 230) (internal citations omitted).
226. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60 (1975).
227. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 219.
229. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 59-60 (analyzing the case solely in regards to control
through tender offers).
230. See generally Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 49.
231. Id. at 64-65.
232. Id. at 60.
233. Id at 61-62 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2011] 343
Catholic University Law Review
broad discretionary powers of courts in this area, the Supreme Court
stressed the need for equitable relief to reflect "[fjlexibility rather than
rigidity" as well as "mercy and practicality," and it also noted that an
injunction should be "[an] instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims."234 This is certainly not incorrect, but it
is an important choice of emphasis.
B. Problems with Interpretation ofRondeau and the Potential Solution
Arguably, much of the Court's language constitutes dicta. For at its
heart, Rondeau is a case about "the exercise of the [trial] court's sound
judicial discretion to deny an application for an injunction."235 The
Seventh Circuit was wrong to override the district court's exercise of this
discretion, and it was doubly wrong to impose a different standard for the
adjudication of prayers for injunctive relief.2 36
But Supreme Court dictum is important and influential.237
"Commentators frequently stress the need for lower courts to give
substantial deference even to Supreme Court dicta,"238 and that appears to
be what they are doing with respect to Rondeau. Rather than reading and
applying Rondeau narrowly, the lower courts have been reading and
applying Rondeau broadly.239 Instead of standing for the proposition that
injunctive relief under the Williams Act is subject to the traditional
elements that always inform the availability of injunctive relief, Rondeau
has been interpreted to hold that "[t]he mere failure to file a timely
Schedule 13D cannot in itself amount to irreparable injury sufficient to
justify equitable relief."240 Indeed, the mainstream reading of Rondeau is
234. Id. at 61 (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 229-30).
235. Id at 61-62.
236. See id. at 60-62 (holding that the Seventh Circuit's disregard for the traditional
requirement of irreparable harm was inaccurate).
237. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1084 & n.422 (2005) ("Supreme Court dicta may have substantial persuasive influence on
lower courts.").
238. Id But see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1249, 1274 (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court dicta is not binding and that
lower courts must adjudicate issues themselves).
239. See supra text accompanying note 190.
240. Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1985); accord Gen.
Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing Rondeau, 422 U.S. at
60-65) ("In Rondeau, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that a violation of
the Williams Act, without more, justifies the issuance of an injunction; in accordance with
traditional equitable principles a showing of irreparable harm must be made."); Condec
Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 n.3, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (explaining that, though
the plaintiff claimed that irreparable harm results from "any change in corporate
management which is effected by unlawful means," the court "believe[d] that the teaching of
Rondeau is to the contrary").
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such that one Williams Act defendant was emboldened to "contend that ...
injunctions are never proper remedies for 13(d) violations, by
characterizing the law as 'a technical reporting rule."'
241
This attitude is seriously problematic because it results in a reduced
incentive for corporate insurgents to make full and timely disclosures as
the Act requires. In fact, in the event of a Williams Act violation, the
usual outcome is dismissal after the violator belatedly files a Schedule
13D, which renders the case moot.243 The Seventh Circuit recognized the
seriousness of the absence of an incentive in Bath Industries v. Blot:
The purpose of the [Schedule 13D] filing and notification
provisions is to give investors and stockholders the opportunity
to assess the insurgents' plans before selling or buying stock in
the corporation. It additionally gives them the opportunity to
hear from incumbent management on the merit or lack of merit
of the insurgents' proposals. If the defendant-appellants' late
filing is sufficient, then no insurgent group will ever file until
news of their existence and plan leaks out and prompts a law
244
suit.
A minor, and likely justifiable, interpretive shift can aid tremendously in
remedying this situation. The shift results from recognizing the difference
between asserting that a Williams Act violation relieves a plaintiff from
showing irreparable harm, as the Seventh Circuit held, to arguing that a
Williams Act violation gives rise to merely a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm. It is upon this difference that this Article's suggested
reinterpretation of Rondeau is founded.
In reinterpreting Rondeau, this Article starts from the proposition that
courts have "broad discretion to evaluate the irreparability of alleged
harm."245 Accordingly, there is a degree of latitude in determining the
nature of a § 13(d) violation. Indeed, the Rondeau Court explicitly
conceded this, observing that "we have not hesitated to recognize the
241. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705, 725 (D.D.C. 1988) (citation
omitted).
242. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (stating that relief will be denied if a
Schedule 13D has been filed after the action is brought, thus the violator is neither deterred
nor punished).
243. See supra text accompanying note 184; see also CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund
Mgt. (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Rondeau ... make[s]
clear that a prerequisite to [injunctive] relief is a showing of irreparable harm. . . . Second
Circuit cases go so far as to suggest, in dicta, that irreparable harm can not be established
once corrective disclosure is made.").
244. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970) (second emphasis
added). Bath Industries, Inc. was decided in 1970, five years before Rondeau was handed
down. See id at 97; see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 49 (1975).
245. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1271 (1st Cir. 1996)
(quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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power of federal courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws
violations when to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and
necessary for the protection of investors."246
As discussed,247 the traditional standard for assessing whether an injury
is irreparable is whether "the damages occasioned are estimable only by
conjecture, and not by an accurate standard."2 48 A § 13(d) violation should
be irreparable under a broad range of circumstances, for example if it was
discovered too close to the date of an annual meeting or after corporate
control had changed hands. 24 9 SEC Regulation 13D suggests that ten days
is the minimum amount of time before an annual meeting for a § 13(d)
violation to be cured without a finding of irreparable injury.250 Given the
complexities and uncertainties of the marketplace, a § 13(d) violation
cured earlier than ten days could be irreparable on account of the countless
number of individual shareholder decisions that might have been made
differently but for the violation. Indeed, courts have expressed concern
over the voting or purchasing of shares during an ongoing proceeding
involving a § 13(d) violation, and have sometimes enjoined such activity,
including the holding of an annual shareholders' meeting, until the
violation was cured. Armed with this understanding, courts could
readily adopt a rebuttable resumption of irreparability when confronted
with a § 13(d) violation.2 Making this presumption rebuttable, and
acknowledging that certain extenuating circumstances could cause
a § 13(d) violation to be reparable, conforms this general rule to Rondeau.
246. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 62.
247. See supra text accompanying note 167.
248. Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 143 F. Supp. 826, 835 n.3 (W.D. La.
1956) (quoting 28 AM. JUR. Injunctions § 48, at 244-45 (1940)).
249. See Bath Indus., 427 F.2d at 110 ("The Williams Act is clearly related to the proxy
provisions and should be construed to operate in harmony with them."); 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Corporations § 943, at 964 (2004) ("If a material misrepresentation is shown in connection
with the solicitation of proxies, courts will ordinarily declare the proxies invalid, possibly
altering or rescinding the outcome of any vote for which the proxies were used. After an
election, losers may be successful in seeking to overturn the results." (footnotes omitted));
see also MTD Serv. Corp. v. Weldotron Corp., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 198,395, at 90,711 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994) (denying injunctive relief because
stockholders received all material information, a new board of directors was elected, and
control of the defendant corporation changed); supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(e)(2) (2010) (declaring that "until the expiration of the tenth
day from the date of the filing of the Schedule 13D . . . that person shall not: (i) Vote or
direct the voting" of recently acquired shares).
251. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(noting that there is irreparable harm when the public and shareholders trade in an arena that
does not have requisite information needed to make safe and informed decisions). This is
one articulation of a situation in which a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm could be
appropriate.
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This approach also guards against incumbent management using § 13(d) to
its advantage.
Whereas the Seventh Circuit's position, which the Court reversed in
Rondeau, would have precluded a defendant from arguing that its violation
of § 13(d) was harmless or otherwise not irreparable, this Article's
proffered reinterpretation of Rondeau does not preclude this defense. 253
This reinterpretation is consistent with Rondeau's holding and, as such,
does not change the result of the case. The factual predicate in Rondeau
was the district court's decision not to provide injunctive relief for
violations of the Williams Act that were "inadvertent" and coupled with
"immediate steps to rectify."254  At issue was the correctness of the
subsequent Seventh Circuit conclusion that Mosinee's "claim was not to be
judged according to traditional equitable principles, and that the bare fact
that petitioner violated the Williams Act justified entry of an injunction
against him."255 This aggressive and broad position proffered that, as a
matter of law, a Williams Act violation warranted injunctive relief.256 In
response, the Supreme Court took a much narrower view, one which stated
that the traditional rules governing in,unctive relief-including its
discretionary nature-remained applicable.
Because of the particulars of the Rondeau case, this Article posits that
Rondeau does not preclude a plaintiff from arguing, nor a court from
concluding, that barring extenuating circumstances, a § 13(d) violation,
without more, does indeed result in irreparable injury. The only argument
and conclusion precluded by Rondeau is that a § 13(d) violation
automatically results in irreparable harm. In other words, a rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm flowing from a § 13(d) violation remains
a legitimate interpretation of Rondeau.25
253. The defendant in Rondeau unsuccessfully made this very argument to the Seventh
Circuit. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422
U.S. 49 (1975) ("[Defendant] contends that it would be improper to grant plaintiffs claim
for equitable remedies in view that [plaintiff] has suffered no harm, let alone irreparable
harm by reason of his violation of Section 13(d)."). In the last paragraph of the Rondeau
decision, the Supreme Court declared that a § 13(d) claimant is not "relieved of showing
irreparable harm and other usual prerequisites for injunctive relief." Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 65 (1975). This can be fairly construed as dicta, however, as the
holding of Rondeau, strictly speaking, is the reversal of the Seventh Circuit's decision to
forgo the traditional analysis of injunctive relief. Id Regardless, Rondeau does not
explicitly forbid a minimalist approach to showing irreparable injury in the context of
a § 13(d) violation; the only thing it explicitly forbids is dispensing with this showing and
analysis altogether.
254. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 60.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 61-62.
258. In keeping with this reading of Rondeau, the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that a
§ 13(d) violation gave rise to an irrebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. See Mosinee
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Such an interpretation of Rondeau would further the objectives of the
Williams Act by more properly incentivizing potential violators to comply
with § 13(d). These potential violators would no longer be assured of a
"free pass" through which a violation could readily be cured by merely
doing that which they were obliged to do in any event: file a Schedule
13D. Accordingly, accumulators of more than five percent of a company's
stock would recognize that failure to follow the Act's requirements comes
with potentially serious consequences.
Concerns over "flexibility," "mercy," and "practicality" can all be
quelled by precluding stringent, equitable relief under circumstances in
which the violation was unintentional and insignificant-indeed, such are
the exact the Supreme Court noted in Rondeau.259 Such an approach
would strike a "nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims" 260
by: (1) safeguarding the investing public and corporate shareholders from
trading stock without accurate knowledge of the potential for a change in
corporate control; (2) protecting insurgents who unintentionally
violated § 13(d) in situations where their violations were inconsequential;
and (3) promoting compliance with, and private enforcement of, the
Williams Act.
Finally, the distinction between "punishment" and "deterrence"-a
traditional consideration in awarding injunctive relief as highlighted by the
261Court in Rondeau -should not be overstated. Stringent, equitable relief,
although punitive in nature, would certainly serve to deter both the
defendant in a Williams Act suit, and others similarly situated, from failing
to file the requisite Schedule 13D in the future.262
C. Legislative Intent and Its Reinterpretation
Compounding the common (mis)reading of Rondeau is the lower courts'
misunderstanding of the Williams Act's legislative intent. The Act as
ultimately passed was carefully crafted to avoid "tipping the scales either
in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bids."263 Although recognizing that "[t]he discretion of a district court to
Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975)
(finding any filing is enough to show irreparable harm).
259. Rondeau, 433 U.S. at 61 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30
(1944)).
260. Id. (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30).
261. See id (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30) ("The historic injunctive process
was designed to deter, not to punish.").
262. See infra text accompanying notes 281-85.
263. Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977)); see supra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text.
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fashion remedies in this area is broad" 264 in order to "preserv[e] the
integrity of the requirements of the securities laws and preventing violators
from profiting by the violation," 265 courts have interpreted the legislative
history of the Williams Act as "militat[ing] against injunctive
remedies ... that go beyond correction of past violations and unduly favor
incumbent management." 266 As a result, in practice the courts "generally
have refused requests for more extensive or long-lasting relief."267
What the courts have overlooked, however, is the difference between the
operation of compliance with § 13(d) and the violation of § 13(d). If
complied with, the Act is largely neutral in its effects. If violated, any
remedy imposed would, inevitably, function to the disadvantage of the
party committing the breach. Such a consequence should not be read as
violating the intended neutrality of the Act. In short, the intended
neutrality of the Act's reporting provisions should not constrain the courts
268in fashioning a remedy in the event of the Act's breach.
D. Rondeau Is Bad Law
The continued influence of the Rondeau decision is regrettable for one
final, important reason: Rondeau rested upon a presumption that no longer
holds. Specifically, in response to the argument that "an injunction is
necessary to protect the interests of . . . shareholders who either sold their
stock . . . at predisclosure prices or would not have invested had they
known that a takeover bid was imminent," 269 the Court, after first
wondering whether "the type of 'harm' identified ... is redressable" under
the Williams Act,270 stated that "[i]n any event, those persons who
allegedly sold at an unfairly depressed price have an adequate remedy by
way of an action for damages, thus negating the basis for equitable
relief."271
As previously discussed, cases decided after Rondeau have proven this
272presumption wrong. Plaintiffs do not have an action at law for damages
264. Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970).
265. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
266. ICN Pharm. v. Khan, 2 F.3d 484, 491 (2d Cir. 1993).
267. See Conti et al., supra note 143, at 336-37.
268. Notably, the Second Circuit explicitly counseled against stringent remedies on the
ground that they too would "unduly favor incumbent management." ICNPharm., 2 F.3d at
491. However, this conflates the effect of compliance with the effect of violation.
269. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975).
270. Id. at 60. The Court made this statement in light of its reading of the "principal
object of the Williams Act" as addressing "the dilemma of shareholders desiring to respond
to a cash tender offer." Id. This reading is narrow and incomplete. See supra text
accompanying notes 226-29.
271. Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 60.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
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in the event that someone violates the Williams Act by failing to file a
Schedule 13D.2 73 Thus, contrary to the Court's conclusion in Rondeau, the
basis for equitable relief is not negated in these situations. 2 74 This casts
significant doubt on the continued viability of Rondeau as precedent. 27 5
IV. ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVES
Due largely to a misinterpretation of Rondeau and the misreading of
legislative history, courts over the last thirty-five years have failed to
properly remedy violations of the Williams Act. 276  In fact, the current
regime of remedies for Williams Act violations undermines the objectives
of the Act by encoura ing gamesmanship and, in some instances,
discouraging disclosure.27
A reinterpretation of Rondeau would incentivize insurgents to take more
seriously their disclosure obligations under the Williams Act. Additional
correctives are also possible, however.
A. Incentivizing Management
Individual shareholders are highly unlikely to spot a Williams Act
violation and, therefore, are unable to effectively police § 13(d). Further,
273. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46. Plaintiffs only have an action at law
for damages if someone files a misleading Schedule 13D. See supra text accompanying
notes 145-46; see also Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d
613, 619-20 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no private damages remedy for issuers under §
13(d)."); Rosenbaum v. Klein, 547 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing, in part,
the reasoning behind prohibiting "a cause of action for damages by shareholders who do not
allege detrimental reliance .. . on misrepresentation in reports filed"); Berman v. Metzger,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,857, at 90,294 (D.D.C. 1981) ("[T]his Court concludes that in
section 13(d) Congress expressed no intent to create a private right of action for damages.").
274. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 60.
275. See Thomas J. Long, Deciding Whether Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent
Warrant Certiorari, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1104, 1107 (1984) ("[C]onflict may also arise from a
lower court's assertion that applicable Supreme Court precedent is no longer authoritative.").
Of course, the ability of lower courts to disregard Rondeau is a controversial question
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by
Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 151, 151 (2009) (noting the Supreme Court's ability to
overrule its precedents, but observing that "some have suggested that lower courts should
have some ability to disregard Supreme Court precedent"). But even if Rondeau is not
outright disregarded, the suggestion that it is no longer good law counsels in favor of reading
the case narrowly and confining it to its specific facts and procedural context.
276. See supra Part Ill.
277. See Conti et al., supra note 143, at 335 ("An acquiror could simply ignore or
violate the reporting requirements under the Williams Act until a court orders it to make
curative disclosure, at which time it would make such a curative filing with little concern for
other sanctions."). But see Macey & Netter, supra note 37, at 137 (referring to the usual
remedies for a Williams Act violation as "draconian" and noting that the "very costly"
nature of an injunction creates a "strong incentive" for compliance with the Act's
provisions).
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the SEC has not made a priority of enforcing § 13(d)'s filing
278
requirements. As such, the incumbent management of a target
corporation is the party best positioned to catch and litigate a Williams Act
violation because it has both the ability and wherewithal to find and
confront Williams Act violators.279 Additionally, incumbent management
has an incentive to do so-changes in corporate control often result in new
management.280
Thus, one might expect incumbent management to actively ferret out
and pounce upon Williams Act violators, thereby mitigating the lack of
voluntary compliance with § 13(d).281 However, in light of the remedies
currently available to management, there is little incentive to do this. In
fact, given the strin ent approach courts have taken regarding the issue of
"irreparable harm," 2 there is every incentive for management to not
report its knowledge of a § 13(d) violation until a cure would no longer be
possible, such as shortly before an annual meeting.283 Only under those
278. In fact, applicable research has unearthed only one decided case that the SEC
brought, and it was predicated solely on a defendant's failure to file a Schedule 13D. SEC v.
First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705, 707-08 (D.D.C. 1988). In every other case the SEC
brought involving a defendant's failure to file a Schedule 13D, that particular violation is
one of a long list of additional, more serious securities-law violations that typically involved
fraud. See, e.g., SEC v. Prousalis, [Transfer Binder 2004-2005] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) 93,140, at 95,799 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2005) (describing the charges brought against
the defendant including violations of §§ 10(b), 17(a), and 13(d)(1)); SEC v. World-Wide
Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 754-56 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (noting multiple violations of the
Williams Act); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1981), overruled
in part by 292 F. App'x 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing multiple alleged violations of the
Williams Act); SEC v. Diversified Indus, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 106-07 (D.D.C. 1979)
(noting the seven counts in the complaint, including the § 13(d) violation): SEC v. Gen.
Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-51 (D.D.C. 1975) (acknowledging the multiple
claims that the SEC filed in addition to the § 13(d) claim). The other case somewhat on
point is SEC v. Palmer Financial Corp., which was a case brought by the SEC that ordered a
defendant to show cause when his failure to file a Schedule 13D along with certain other
documents had violated the provisions of a pre-existing, permanent injunction entered
against him. No. 88-305, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9216, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1988).
This record of cases marginalizes the deterrent effect of criminal liability for failing to file a
Schedule 13D, a topic on which there are apparently no decided cases. The case that comes
closest to addressing this concept is SEC v. Prousalis, a case against Thomas Prousalis
which was "based on the exact same facts, and charging essentially identical violations" as
an earlier criminal case brought against him. [Transfer Binder 2004-2005] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) T 93,140, at 95,799 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2005).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
280. See Jessica Jackson, Note, Much Ado About Nothing? The Antitrust Implications of
Private Equity Club Deals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 697, 707 (2008); Jonathan R. Macey, Market for
Corporate Control, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 245-58.
283. See Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1063-64 (D. Del. 1982).
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circumstances could management hope for a judicial remedy with real
bite.284 Such a strategy frustrates § 13(d)'s timely disclosure
requirement.285
The first reaction to such gamesmanship may be that such a course of
conduct would cause a court to find that management had waived its right
to object to the § 13(d) violation, or that management could not maintain a
claim because it comes with unclean hands. 286  However, courts have
correctly noted that these arguments hold little water; § 13(d) exists to
protect investors, not management, and management's mistakes or
287
connivings should not preclude enforcement of the statute. As one court
explained:
To bar equitable relief on the grounds that management has
also acted improperly would ignore the rights of the true party in
interest and add to the information withheld from investors and
shareholders. While existing management may have ulterior
motives in seeking injunctive relief for alleged violations of
Section 13(d), such relief will be granted only to protect
shareholders and the investing public from irreparable harm that
results when the Section is violated. The alleged "unclean
hands" on the part of the plaintiff is not a bar to the injunctive
relief sought in this case.28
If Rondeau is reinterpreted as suggested, it would contribute much in the
way of incentivizing incumbent management to swiftly report
Williams Act violations. After all, the current reluctance to report
emanates from the lack of a strong remedial regime, which itself stems
from the Rondeau decision. But even if Rondeau's effects have been
muted, the presumption of harm remains rebuttable. Thus, gamesmanship
on the part of management would persist; its time frame would simply
change. That is, management would still have little incentive to report
a § 13(d) violation if it learns of the violation at an early point in time
when the assertion of irreparable harm could most likely be rebutted.
Thus, to rectify the possibility that management will intentionally delay
reporting of Williams Act violations, and to address the fact that Rondeau
284. See supra notes 120, 145, 249.
285. See supra text accompanying note 53.
286. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §2.4(2), at 68 (1993) ("One who comes
into equity must come with clean hands." (internal quotations omitted)).
287. See Indiana Nat'l Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Section
13(d) was not intended to protect incumbent management or to discourage take over bids.
Its sole purpose was the protection of shareholders." (internal citations omitted)); K-N
Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 770 (D. Colo. 1983) ("The purpose of
Section 13(d) . . . is not to protect the existing management of the issuer, but to provide
material information to the shareholders of the issuer as well as to potential investors and the
market as a whole.").
288. K-N Energy, Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 770.
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may continue to be interpreted and followed as it has been, courts should
readily recognize shareholders' claims for a breach of fiduciary duty
against an incumbent management that learns of, but fails to report, a
§ 13(d) violation.
Under corporate law, directors and officers of a corporation have a
fiduciary relationship with the corporation's shareholders,289 which gives
rise to the duties of care and loyalty.290 The duty of care demands that
"directors . . . conduct themselves as ordinarily prudent persons managing
their own affairs." 291 The duty of loyalty is violated, in relevant part,
"[w]here directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities."292
Thus, management's failure to act upon knowledge of a § 13(d)
violation can be viewed as either a breach of the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty, depending on the circumstances. As such, management would be
293
vulnerable to a shareholder derivative lawsuit for this breach. Although
it may be difficult for shareholders to prevail in such a suit for a variety of
reasons, such as the business judgment rule,294 the mere specter of this
litigation would certainly create some disincentive for management to
withhold information regarding a § 13(d) violation for later strategic use.
In fact, it may encourage management to take greater vigilance in
identifying and reporting violations.
B. Governmental Prioritization
There are a range of measures that either Congress or the SEC could
potentially take to remedy the problems identified in this Article.
Congress could amend the Williams Act in such a way that overrules
Rondeau. More specifically, Congress could add a provision declaring that
the Act's violation creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury,
thereby triggering the availability of injunctive relief.
289. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 (1972) ("[T]he directors ... have a
fiduciary duty to promote the interest of the corporation."); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) (describing the relationship of directors to the
corporation as being fiduciary in nature).
290. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239-40 (Del. 2009) (discussing
the fiduciary duties that directors owe to the corporations they serve).
291. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (2005).
292. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
293. See E. Taylor Stukes, In Re Wachovia Shareholders Litigation: The Case for the
Common Benefit Doctrine, 84 N.C. L. REV. 2066, 2069-70 (2006) (explaining a derivative
suit); see also Fl. Comm. Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985)
(noting that shareholders may make a claim of waste against management and receive the
typical remedies if successful).
294. See Stukes, supra note 293, at 2071-72.
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As discussed, with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, Congress amended 21C of the 1934 Act, enabling
the SEC to levy monetary penalties for Williams Act violations regardless
of the violator. The SEC could use this to fine Williams Act violators in
administrative proceedings.
Lastly, the SEC could more aggressively pursue Williams Act violators
in general. As discussed, such actions appear quite rare, at least when
brought solely because of a failure to file a Schedule 13D. Prioritizing
this would be significant because of the SEC's newly acquired ability to
levy fines in administrative proceedings against any Williams Act violator,
as well as the SEC's long-standing absolution from the need to prove
irreparable injury when seeking injunctive relief in civil actions. 297
Accordingly, this allows the SEC to avoid the obstacles Rondeau places in
the path of other private litigants. 298 Additionally, accompanying greater
SEC scrutiny would be the possibility of criminal liability for those cases
the SEC deemed egregious enough to warrant criminal prosecution at the
hands of the Department of Justice.
V. CONCLUSION
It is beyond reasonable dispute that judicially crafted remedies to
Williams Act violations should promote of the aims of the Act. Thus,
these remedies should effectuate the informational disclosures mandated
by the Williams Act. In order to accomplish this, these remedies must
create a set of incentives that encourage potential violators to comply with
the Act and that urge those in the best position to monitor
compliance-namely, incumbent corporate management-to readily report
violations. The current remedial regime, which is marked by undue
leniency, fails to provide such incentives; indeed, the current remedial
regime is arguably counterproductive in that it discourages both strict
compliance with § 13(d) and prompt reporting of violations.
By increasing the severity of the available relief, potential Williams Act
violators will be more likely to comply, and issuers who fear potential
takeover bids will be more likely to readily report noncompliance because
of the increased possibility to obtain significant injunctive relief at an
earlier date. Such a remedial approach would better protect investors from
295. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98, 106-10.
296. See supra note 278. Even the SEC's recent enforcement action against the Wyly
brothers is only partially predicated upon alleged Williams Act violations; the action in large
part concerns securities fraud in violation of § I 0(b)-5 and the other antifraud provisions of
the securities laws. See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 55-57, 63-69, SEC v.
Wyly, No. 10-CIV-5760 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10, 124-26.
298. This may contribute to a greater success rate for the SEC in Schedule 13D
litigation. See supra note 179.
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trading on inaccurate or incomplete information-an interest that is as
compelling today as it was when Congress first passed the Williams Act.
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